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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of the funded pension scheme on capital accumulation in 
general equilibrium when the time discount factor is endogenously determined. A two-period 
overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply and a balanced funded pension 
scheme is employed. In the benchmark model with exogenous discount factor, the funded 
pension scheme is neutral to capital accumulation. Contrastingly, in the model with endogenous 
discount factor, I assume that discount factor is increasing in economy-wide average saving level, 
and find that the funded pension scheme is negative to capital accumulation. 
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1. Introduction
The funded pension scheme as a mandatory saving instrument is shown to be completely neutral 
or positive to capital accumulation by previous studies, for example, de la Croix and Michel (2002), 
Zhang (1995) and Kaganovich and Zilcha (2012). However, some empirical studies find that funded 
pension system has a negative impact on capital accumulation (for example, Singh (1996)). This 
empirical phenomenon has been theoretically explained by several factors, for example, family 
altruism (Kunze (2012)). This paper finds another theoretical explanation for the negative impact 
from the aspect of time preference. The aim of this paper is to show that when time preference is 
endogenously determined, a balanced funded pension scheme is negative to capital accumulation, in 
contrast to the neutral effect when time preference is exogenous.
A number of theoretical studies incorporate endogenous time preference. The assumptions 
on endogenous time preference mainly include two types: with internalization and without 
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internalization. Uzawa (1968) and Stern (2006) use individual variables as the determinants of time 
preference parameter and hence the individual variables are internalized. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2003), Bian and Meng (2004), and Sodini (2011) assume that time preference parameter depends 
on economy-wide average variables which are taken as given. This paper is accordant with the latter, 
and assumes that discount factor is endogenously determined by economy-wide average saving 
level. As Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) point out, the specification without internalization makes 
the model computationally simpler and does not predict significantly different result from the one 
with internalization. This paper follows Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Stern (2006) by assuming 
that time preference depends on the variables which push out current consumption. Furthermore, 
the assumption of decreasing marginal impatience (DMI) is consistent with many empirical studies 
(Lawrance (1991), Samwick (1998) and Ikeda et al. (2006)).
This paper employs a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous labor supply and 
a balanced funded pension scheme. General equilibrium is derived in goods, labor and capital market. 
The model with endogenous discount factor is compared with the benchmark model where discount 
factor is exogenously given. In the presence of endogenous discount factor, which is increasing 
in economy-wide average saving level, a balanced funded pension scheme in negative to capital 
accumulation. This is contrasted with the result of the benchmark model.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the benchmark model where discount 
factor is exogenously given. Section 3 investigates the effect of funded pension scheme on capital 
accumulation when discount is endogenous. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Benchmark Model with Exogenous Time Preference
2.1 The Benchmark Model
Consider an economy populated by overlapping generations living for two periods (the young and 
the old). I assume that time is discrete and infinite. In every period, there live two generations. In this 
economy, I assume constant population and that the population of each generation is one.
For generation  who is born in period , she determines labor supply ( ) in 
her first period of life. The consumption levels of generation  in her first and second periods are  
and  respectively.  denotes the saving level in her young period. When generation  is working, 
she receives wage at a rate of .
Assume that the government imposes a funded pension scheme in the young period and gives a 
pension benefit in old age. The proportional pension contribution rate is , and the pension 
benefit . The budget constraints of the consumer include
  (1)
 and  (2)
where  denotes the interest factor in period .
A balanced funded pension scheme reads
  (3)
For preference, I assume logarithmic utility function as follows:
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  (4)
where  denotes the discount factor which is exogenously given in the benchmark model. 
According to Stern (2006), discount factor  measures the consumer’s appreciation of future utility. A 
smaller  implies stronger impatience.
In this economy, there is a firm which produces homogeneous goods with capital and labor. I 
assume that the firm has the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
  (5)
where  denotes the total capital in period ,  the total labor demand,  the total factor 
productivity, and  the output elasticity of capital.
2.2 The Benchmark Solution
Consumer’s budget constraints (1) and (2), and preference (4) jointly determine the optimal 
consumption level and labor supply in young period, and the first order conditions are
  (6)
  (7)
Combining equations (6) and (7) gives
  (8)
The equilibrium conditions of capital and labor markets read
  (9)
  (10)
The firm maximizes its profit and the first order conditions are
  (11)
  (12)
where  denotes the capital intensity. Therefore, production function (5) is also in the form
  (13)
Equation (9) and (10) imply
  (14)
Substituting (1), (12) and (13) into (14) leads to
  (15)
Equation (15) implies
  (16)
Meanwhile, substituting (11) and (12) into equation (7) implies
  (17)
Combining (16) and (17) leads to
  (18)
Substituting (12) and (18) into (9) gives
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  (19)
Equation (8) and (12) imply
  (20)
Using (1), (18), (19) and (20), and substituting (12), we have:
  (21)
Equation (21) determines the dynamics of the capital intensity, which drives the economic growth in 
this model.
2.3 The Growth Effect of Wage Tax
In this benchmark model, output per capita  is endogenously decided by capital intensity  
( ). In the steady state where , equation (21) implies
  (22)
Therefore, the effect of the balanced funded pension scheme on steady-state capital accumulation and 
output per capita can be measured by . It is straightforward that this funded pension scheme has 
no effects on steady-state capital accumulation in the benchmark model where the time discount factor 
is exogenously given.
Proposition 1 When the discount factor is exogenously given, the funded pension scheme is neutral to 
steady-state capital accumulation ( ).
Intuitively, capital accumulation comes from voluntary saving by consumers and mandatory 
contribution by pension system. On one hand, mandatory contribution increases with pension 
contribution rate. On other hand, voluntary saving decreases with pension contribution rate because 
disposal income is lower. The increase in mandatory contribution offsets the decrease in voluntary 
saving, and therefore funded pension scheme does not have effect on capital intensity.
It also can be concluded that funded pension scheme is neutral to steady-state output per capita 
which is monotonically increasing in capital intensity. Equation (22) also implies that the steady-state 
capital intensity increases with the constant discount factor.
3. Endogenous Time Preference
Section 2 discusses the benchmark model where the discount factor  is exogenous. Now we leave 
the world of exogenous discount factor. This section incorporates endogenous time preference by 
assuming:
  (23)
where , and  denotes the economy-wide average saving level. Notice that  implies 
decreasing marginal impatience (DMI) in saving. In other words, the consumers who hold more 
savings are more patient. The assumption of DMI is supported by many empirical evidences (for 
example, Lawrance (1991), Samwick (1998) and Ikeda et al. (2006)).
This assumption is in line with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Bian and Meng (2004), and Sodini 
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(2011), which all assume that the endogenous time preference parameter is determined by aggregate 
per capita variable. Therefore, consumers do not internalize economy-wide average saving  and 
take it as given. In equilibrium we have  ex post, because all consumers are identical. Including 
saving level as the determinate of discount factor is in line with Becker and Mulligan (1997), and 
Stern (2006). They claim that determinants of discount factor push out current consumption.
Substituting (23) into equation (21) leads to
  (24)
Hence in the steady state
  (25)
Proposition 2 demonstrates the effect of funded pension scheme on capital intensity in the presence of 
endogenous discount factor.
Proposition 2 When the discount factor is increasing in economy-wide average saving, the funded 
pension scheme is negative to steady-state capital accumulation ( ).
This result is obtained by differentiating steady-state capital intensity with respect to proportional 
pension contribution rate. The proof is in the Appendix.
Intuitively, increasing pension contribution rate leads to less voluntary saving. Lower saving level 
causes smaller discount factor (because of DMI) which makes the consumer gives less weight to 
the future life. Hence the consumer chooses to supply less labor, which causes less income and less 
mandatory contribution from pension. Both voluntary saving and mandatory contribution decrease, 
therefore capital intensity is lower.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper explains why a funded pension scheme can have a negative impact on capital 
accumulation from the aspect of patience. It discusses two alternative assumptions on time preference 
(exogenous and endogenous discount factor) in two parallel models, and compares the effect of the 
funded pension scheme on capital accumulation in these two models. In the benchmark model with 
exogenous discount factor, the funded pension scheme is neutral to capital accumulation. However, in 
the model with endogenous discount factor the effect of a funded pension scheme is negative.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 When the discount factor is increasing in economy-wide average saving, the funded 
pension scheme is negative to steady-state capital accumulation ( ).
Proof. I take the derivative of  with respect to the pension contribution rate  in order to 
investigate the effect of funded pension scheme on steady-state capital intensity:
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  (A.1)
Because  and , . Therefore, the effect of funded pension scheme on capital 
accumulation is negative.
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